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Abstract 
The sharing economy allows consumers to share spare goods and resources through online 
platforms, using technology to reduce the transaction costs and efficiently match supply with 
demand on a global scale. Reflecting a change in consumption patterns, the sharing economy 
is disrupting existing industries, steadily replacing ownership with access.  
To explain observed consumer behaviour in the sharing economy, we develop an economic 
model that describes consumers’ choice of providing and receiving access to underutilised 
goods. The model is applied to the market for ridesharing, where owners with empty seats are 
connected with passengers looking for a ride. 
Modelling the purchase decision, we find that the number of consumers who purchase a car 
increases when 1) the price of sharing increases, 2) the price of owning decreases, 3) the 
owner’s transaction cost decreases and 4) the passenger’s transaction cost increases. On the 
supply side, the number of consumers offering a lift in their car to others increases when 1) the 
revenue generated from sharing increases, 2) the owner’s transaction cost decreases and 3) the 
passenger’s transaction cost increases. On the demand side, the number of consumers riding 
with others increases when 1) the price of sharing decreases, 2) the owner’s transaction cost 
increases and 3) the passenger’s transaction cost decreases. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, access has emerged as a viable substitute for ownership in many sectors 
of the economy. The rise of the sharing economy, in which consumers share excess assets, time 
and skills directly with each other, is enabled by digital platforms that reduce transaction costs 
and efficiently match supply with demand. Ensuring cost efficiency, the sharing economy 
generates a more efficient use of resources, which in turn entails extensive economic and 
environmental benefits. Involving deeper human interactions than regular market transactions, 
social sharing re-emerges the community, creating a culture of what is mine is yours. Or more 
precisely: what is mine is yours, for a fee.  
To explain the consumer behaviour evolving with the rise of the sharing economy, we develop 
an economic model that describes the decisions to purchase and use shareable goods. 
Addressing the underlying mechanisms of consumer decision-making, the model seeks to 
answer the following research question: How does peer-to-peer sharing influence consumer 
behaviour? As opposed to prior research, our model considers both the supply and demand side 
of the sharing economy, providing theoretical explanations for consumers’ choice of both 
providing and receiving access to underutilised goods and resources.  
Considering the demand for shared goods, empirical evidence suggests that sharing may be 
preferred to ownership as it allows access to goods at lower cost. On the supply side, an owner 
has the opportunity to benefit if she can enjoy any positive utility from sharing goods that 
exhibit idle capacity. In correspondence with rational utility models, Benkler (2004) provides a 
transactional framework for understanding the decision to share goods with others. Following 
his work, we encompass the utility obtained from sharing in our model of consumer behaviour. 
The utility may have a monetary value, but can also take the form of social or psychological 
gains that arise through sharing. More recently, Müller (2014) develops a model explaining 
consumer decision-making in the context of online sharing systems. We employ an adapted 
version of his segmentation of consumers to the market for ridesharing, and modify the 
corresponding expressions for the net utility achieved from sharing. Based on the set of 
alternatives associated with the decisions to purchase and use a car, we divide the market into 
four consumers groups. Explaining the allocation of consumers to the various segments, the 
model may be used to make predictions on how behaviour is affected by a change in the costs 
related to ownership and sharing of private goods. As the number of consumers in each segment 
is given outside our model, we only observe the endogenous changes in consumer allocation, 
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and cannot predict the effect on aggregated demand. Providing a methodology applicable to 
other markets of shareable goods, the model fills a gap in the literature on the sharing economy 
and lays the groundwork for future empirical research.  
Modelling the purchase decision, we assume that for given prices, a consumer will be 
indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing a car when the two options provide equal 
utility. The number of consumers who purchase a car increases when 1) the price of sharing 
increases, 2) the price of owning decreases, 3) the owner’s transaction cost decreases and 4) the 
passenger’s transaction cost increases. Given that a car is purchased, a consumer will be 
indifferent between riding alone and sharing the ride when the utility generated from both 
options is the same. On the supply side, the number of consumers offering a lift in their car to 
others increases when 1) the revenue generated from sharing increases, 2) the owner’s 
transaction cost decreases and 3) the passenger’s transaction cost increases. If not purchasing a 
car, a consumer will be indifferent between riding with others and using public transport if the 
utility generated from these alternatives is the same. Considering the demand side, the number 
of consumers riding with others increases when 1) the price of sharing decreases, 2) the owner’s 
transaction cost increases and 3) the passenger’s transaction cost decreases. By affecting 
consumption patterns, the sharing of spare resources has implications on consumer and 
producer surplus, and subsequently social welfare. Illustrating this disruption, our results are 
relevant for organisations in the sharing economy, established firms responding to peer-to-peer 
entrants and policy makers promoting sharing or regulating permeated sectors.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, a brief introduction to the sharing 
economy is provided in section two. Subsequently, section three gives an overview of the 
theoretical and empirical literature relevant to our research. In particular, we elaborate on the 
impacts of the sharing economy on existing industries and consumption patterns. Based on 
theoretical as well as empirical insight, we establish the model of consumer behaviour and apply 
it to the market for ridesharing in section four. Modelling both the purchase and usage decision 
of a car, we put a particular emphasis on the determinants of supply and demand in the sharing 
economy. On the demand side, sharing enables individuals to get access to a vehicle without 
purchasing a car through a traditional provider. On the supply side, consumers can provide 
access to spare seats in their car that would otherwise be unused. To increase the understanding 
of consumer behaviour, we assess the sensitivity of consumers’ choice of strategy to a change 
in prices, in section five. In section six, we proceed by a broader discussion of results and 
applications of the model. Section seven contains some concluding remarks. 
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2. The sharing economy 
Even though sharing is one of the most elemental forms of economic distribution (Belk, 2010), 
the Internet is “redefining its scope, meaning and possibility”, permitting decentralised sharing 
of goods and services (Botsman & Rogers, 2011). Social sharing platforms enable a nearly 
instantaneous synchronisation of borrowers and lenders, buyers and sellers – efficiently 
matching supply with demand on a global scale. Guests wanting accommodation may search 
for locals renting out extra space. Passengers who need to travel may connect with drivers who 
have available seats. Similarly, individuals may share clothes, meals, toys, tools and even pets 
online. Intangible assets such as time and skills may also be transferred through sharing.  
Often referred to as collaborative consumption, a distinction is made between the “peer 
provider” who supplies access to shareable goods or services, and the “peer user” who demands 
access to the available goods and services (Botsman & Rogers, 2011). Bardhi and Eckhardt 
(2012) describe the phenomenon as “access-based consumption”, indicating that consumers 
prefer access to ownership, valuing the option to pay for temporary access rather than buying 
and owning goods.  
The rise of the sharing economy occurs as persistent environmental concerns and cost 
consciousness are creating a shift away from hyper individualistic consumer behaviour towards 
a revived belief in the importance of the community (Botsman & Rogers, 2011). Collaborative 
consumption challenges the traditional relationship between consumer and producer, disrupting 
the practice of keeping up with, or even outpacing, the Joneses. Online networks bring people 
together again to save time and money, be more environmental-friendly and create relations. 
Consumers strive for simplicity and seek for participation, both enabled by social sharing 
systems. At the same time, traceability and transparency have become increasingly important 
as consumers want to know what and from whom they are buying.  
Studying a myriad of examples of sharing practices, Botsman and Rogers (2011) identify four 
fundamental principles of collaborative consumption: critical mass, idling capacity, belief in 
the commons and trust between strangers. First, critical mass describes the “existence of enough 
momentum in a system to make it become self-sustaining” (Botsman & Rogers, 2011). In order 
to be a relevant alternative to buying through a regular market, the selection of shared goods 
and services must be sufficient. As the number of consumers joining a sharing community 
increases, more goods are likely to be shared, thus people are more likely to find what they are 
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looking for. Critical mass further refers to the social influence that is required to change 
attitudes towards sharing.  
The basic idea of idling capacity is simple. Why own a power drill you barely use, if you could 
save money and space by sharing it with your neighbours or borrowing it from a local sharing 
platform. By definition, goods that can be shared are underutilised (Fremstad, 2014). Through 
sharing platforms, consumers may increase the utilisation rate of their goods by redistributing 
the slack capacity. When joining a sharing community, a consumer is also creating value for 
other consumers, as the system works better when more users are joining. Sharing communities 
rely on this network effect, referred to as belief in the commons. 
Lastly, trust between strangers is required as sharing platforms enable self-managed exchanges 
between peers without an intermediary that governs the transactions (Botsman & Rogers, 2011). 
To reinforce trust between loosely connected individuals, most sharing platforms operate with 
limited regulatory controls and provide feedback mechanisms to encourage collaborative 
behaviour (Fremstad, 2014). The evaluation of others’ trustworthiness is particularly relevant 
when online transactions result in offline exchanges of goods or services, such as sharing your 
home or car with a stranger (Lauterbach, Truong, Shah & Adamic, 2009). Transparent systems 
for user history and ratings further provide an incentive for honesty and hospitality, as having 
a good reputation is likely to increase the possibility of being chosen as a host or driver by 
others in the future. 
Over the next decade, peer-to-peer business models are predicted to overtake ownership as the 
primary way of consumption in some sectors, while remaining a niche in others (PwC, 2015). 
Primarily disrupting the transportation industry, we study the phenomenon ridesharing, in 
which car owners offer lifts in their car to other individuals. For the purpose of the analysis, it 
is important to distinguish between this form of sharing and carsharing, where companies or 
individuals rent out cars for shorter periods or distances. In a ridesharing platform, car owners 
post where they are going and how many seats they have available in their car. Owners may 
also specify the conditions for travelling, such as the size of luggage, tolerance for pets or 
smoking, or preference for music or silence. Individuals without a car search for drivers going 
in the same direction, offering a lift in their car. If a passenger requests a seat, and the owner 
agrees, the pair then arranges the time and place of the pick-up. The passenger pays the agreed 
contribution during the journey. After travelling together, both users are asked to leave a rating 
and comment for the other user, taking anonymity out of the transaction.  
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3. Related literature 
The model of consumer behaviour is built on theoretical literature on sharing and consumer 
behaviour as well as empirical research on the sharing economy. The related studies delineate 
the change in consumer choice that comes with the introduction of peer-to-peer sharing, 
affecting owners, borrowers and the community. 
3.1 Theoretical literature 
As defined by Belk (2007), sharing is “the act and process of distributing what is ours to others 
for their use and/or the act and process of receiving or taking something from others for our 
use.”  Benkler (2004) provides a more concise definition, regarding sharing as “nonreciprocal 
pro-social behaviour.” 
3.1.1 The decision to share 
According to Benkler (2004), an individual will invest in ownership of an asset if the utility 
achieved over the lifetime of the asset is greater than the price of the asset over its lifetime. By 
comparing the utility with the cost of the unit, the decision is detached from the fact that an 
asset may produce more utility over its lifetime than the owner actually needs. Because 
consumers do not require or cannot use the entire capacity of their goods, many resources will 
usually exhibit slack capacity. As an example, Benkler classifies a single trip in a car as a rapidly 
decaying, underutilised asset, indicating that the empty seats in a car going from A to B are 
wasted unless others use the capacity. While secondary markets or management in general may 
solve excess capacity, a more appropriate way of reallocating empty seats would be through 
ridesharing, transferring excess capacity from owners to non-owners. Studying only the supply 
of shareable goods, the author disregards the fact that riding with others may give consumers 
more utility than owning a car. Thus, we extend the model to also include consumers who do 
not own a car but choose to ride with others. 
Considering social sharing systems as transactional frameworks, the gain from sharing an asset 
is dependent on its utilisation over its entire lifetime, not just over any particular period 
(Fremstad, 2014). Thus, perfectly efficient sharing will eliminate the deadweight loss created 
by slack capacity (Benkler, 2004). This is consistent with the economic law of 
disintermediation, suggesting that peer-to-peer markets are more efficient as intermediaries are 
removed (Botsman & Rogers, 2011). 
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According to Benkler (2004), the decision to share involves a series of choices related to the 
inclusion and exclusion of other individuals. Ranging from no exclusion to perfect exclusion, 
an individual considering transferring her goods to others must assess the transaction and 
opportunity cost related to each alternative. While leaving the asset open to anyone’s use entails 
the lowest transaction cost, this alternative is likely to include the highest opportunity cost, 
restricting the owner’s own use of the asset. Perfect exclusion, on the other hand, involves the 
opportunity cost of partial exclusion. As shareable goods provide more capacity over its lifetime 
than the individual requires, the owner will benefit if she can earn any positive utility from 
transferring the capacity to others through sharing. The utility may be monetary measurable, 
but can also take the form of social or psychological gains, being altruistic and environmentally 
responsible. Permitting others to access your goods also involves transaction costs: the search 
and localisation of the goods, the arrangement of the sharing, picking up and dropping off the 
goods (Fremstad, 2014). Moreover, the cost of sharing entails social costs, such as the definition 
of social norms or monitoring and enforcement of the terms of social sharing (Benkler, 2004). 
As pointed out by Fremstad (2014), the social costs are highly dependent on the level of trust 
between the owner of an asset and the borrower. 
The most elementary form of partial exclusion is nonselective, implying sharing on a first come, 
first served basis (Benkler, 2004). However, sharing may also be based on market or social 
selection, limiting the set of permitted users on the basis of market prices or social criteria, 
respectively. Comparing the various strategies, Benkler suggests that sharing will occur when 
the cost of exclusion is higher than the cost of permitting others to use the goods or resources 
they own. The condition indicates that the excess capacity of perfectly private goods that are 
more valuable than the cost of exclusion, will be transferred, and thus shared with others. 
Correspondingly, Fremstad (2014) argues that there are gains from sharing goods or resources 
when the benefit of the borrower exceeds the cost of the lender.   
Transferring the framework to ridesharing, a car is only likely to be shared, if at all, on a partial 
exclusion basis, as nonexclusive sharing may lead to overuse and depletion. Sharing available 
seats on a nonselective basis, the primary perceived cost will be the personal security fear 
associated with picking up hitchhikers. Otherwise, comparing the costs of nonselective and 
selective partial exclusion is more inconclusive. While selectively admitting some users involve 
greater information costs, the monitoring and enforcement costs may be higher for nonselective 
sharing. Either way, the low utilisation rate of an average privately owned vehicle suggests that 
there are considerable economic gains from sharing (Fremstad, 2014). 
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3.1.2 The propensity to share 
According to Belk (2010), an individual’s willingness to share is strongly affected by the 
attachment to the asset, making people more reluctant to share if they possess a strong 
attachment to their belongings. Sharing may also be constrained as people seek to avoid 
interdependence. To account for this in our model, we assume that some car owners achieve a 
higher utility from sharing their car than others do. On the demand side, however, pragmatic 
economic motives suggest an increased propensity to share, as sharing may provide access to 
expensive goods at lower cost. In this way, collaborative consumption enables people to afford 
goods that they could not have afforded on their own.  
Further, Fremstad (2014) argues that norms and preferences are important determinants of the 
level of sharing. Even though the transaction costs of sharing have been reduced, sticky norms 
and endogenous preferences may prevent people from participating in peer-to-peer sharing, 
leaving the potential gains from sharing unexploited.  Over time, Fremstad argues that online 
networks will contribute to a substantial increase in sharing by providing structures for building 
trust between strangers, shifting preferences towards peer-to-peer transactions. The more 
adopters or peers, the larger is the individual utility derived from adoption of sharing 
(Rochelandet & Le Guel, 2005). 
3.1.3 Consumer segmentation 
Ghose et al. (2006) examine the degree of product cannibalisation on new-product sales for 
books when used-products markets are introduced. The insight from the secondary market is 
important as we observe the same tendencies for sharing platforms, both markets featuring a 
wider selection of available goods, lower search costs and lower prices compared to traditional 
first-hand markets. Conducting a theoretical analysis, the authors develop a model to study the 
implications of second-hand markets on consumer and producer welfare. 
The existence of used-books markets makes it possible, but not mandatory, for consumers to 
buy new books and sell them later. As not all consumers may be aware of the presence of the 
secondary markets, or have the incentives to engage in these markets, not all consumers will 
chose the option of reselling their used books. To account for this characteristic, Ghose et al. 
distinguish between three types of buyers: consumers buying and reselling new goods, 
consumers only buying used goods and consumers who not buy anything.  
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Müller (2014), who in an ongoing study explores the economic implications of online sharing 
systems on social welfare, further expands this distinction. The author develops a theoretical 
model explaining consumer decision-making and usage behaviour in the context of online 
sharing systems, where the consumers are given the opportunity to either grant or gain access 
to infrequent-used goods or spaces. Based on the consumer segmentation of Ghose et al. (2006), 
Müller (2014) differentiates between four consumer groups: “(a) consumers that do not buy and 
do not share, (b) consumers that do not buy but share, (c) consumers that buy and share, and 
(d) consumers that buy but do not share an infrequent-use good or space.” 
Deriving expressions for the net utility for consumers who buy and share, and consumers who 
only share, Müller finds that the number of uses of infrequent-used goods or spaces increases 
for both consumer groups if the individual’s monetary utility per use increases. Preliminary 
results further indicate that the number of private uses for consumers who buy and share will 
increase if the price of sharing decreases as a result of increase in the aggregate sharing supply. 
Oppositely, if the price of sharing increases, an owner is likely to increase the number of shares, 
causing a decrease in the number of private uses of the goods or spaces. For consumers who 
only share, the number of uses increases with a decrease in the price of sharing, and decreases 
with a price increase.   
This paper shares methodological traits with the abovementioned study, although we also 
consider the implications on consumer behaviour of a price change in buying infrequent-use 
goods or spaces, overcoming a limitation in Müller’s model. In order to provide a more precise 
description of the net utility for consumers who buy and share, we modify the model by adding 
operative costs of using infrequent-used goods to the net utility expressions. 
In his research agenda, Müller presents three steps towards a deeper understanding of consumer 
behaviour and welfare effects in the sharing economy. Specifically, the author announces 
research on the various upper and lower bounds of the utility gained per use of infrequent-used 
goods or spaces, including the utility where consumers convert from one segment to another. 
Our model provides a method for deriving these indifference points and explaining the 
allocation of consumers to the different market segments.  
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3.2 Empirical literature 
To accurately describe consumer behaviour and welfare in the sharing economy, a review of 
empirical literature on various forms of sharing has been conducted. These studies illustrate the 
power of the sharing economy to change behaviour, and emphasise the economic and decision-
making implications of peer-to-peer sharing. 
A recent stream of empirical work examines the adoption and impacts of sharing in the 
transportation sector. Disruptively changing the transportation landscape, carsharing systems 
enable members to drive cars on demand – by the hour or day. Having access to a car reduces 
the demand for private vehicles to complete a trip, providing both monetary and environmental 
benefits.  
Considering carsharing’s impact on household vehicle holdings, Martin et al. (2010) find that 
every shared vehicle in North America has replaced between 9 and 13 privately owned vehicles 
on the roads. The reduction in vehicles held by members is mainly driven by households with 
one car selling their car to attend carsharing. A large number of members join carsharing as 
their car reaches the age of discarding, suggesting that members postpone a planned purchase. 
However, if a household would consider buying a car in the second-hand market, the potential 
cost saving of carsharing decreases (Duncan, 2011). The cost competitiveness of carsharing 
further depends on driving habits such as frequency and average distance and duration of trips. 
As the number of privately owned cars is reduced, a considerable decrease in the demand for 
parking (Engel-Yan & Passmore, 2013) and fuel consumption (Cervero, Golub & Nee, 2007) 
is observed among carsharing members. Public benefits are also generated through reduction 
in average travel distance and greenhouse gas emissions, as well as through increased average 
occupancy level. Being aware of the accumulative costs of driving, consumers seem to be more 
conscious in choosing when and where to drive when the car is shared. 
Studying the carsharing service Bilkollektivet, Hald et al. (2011) find that the main reasons for 
joining carsharing are the hassle and fixed costs related to owning a car, and environmental 
concerns. Other studies highlight the lack of parking possibilities, low or moderate income or 
high costs related to purchase as factors increasing the probability of joining carsharing (Ruud 
& Ellis, 2008). Benkler (2004) recognises similar motivations for ridesharing, spanning from 
instrumental motives, such as taking advantage of carsharing lanes and reducing the costs of 
driving, to non-instrumental motives, such as having company and thinking green.  
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The propensity towards carsharing decreases as the weekly trip frequency and travel distance 
increase, and increases with augmented familiarity with the system (Luca & Pace, 2014). As 
consumption is rivalry, high demand by some individuals may prevent access to cars for others. 
Consumers’ concern regarding vehicle supply meeting demand is thus an important determinant 
of sharing propensity, even when technical cost, various sources of utility, sharing knowledge 
and perceived degree of substitutability are accounted for (Lamberton & Rose, 2012).  
A similar adaption pattern is observed in the market for travel accommodation. By lowering the 
barriers to entry for providers, the social sharing platform Airbnb enables individuals to 
profitably list their spare room or entire home, offering accommodation to other individuals. 
Estimating the impact of Airbnb on the hotel industry, Zervas et al. (2014) find that a one-
percent increase in Airbnb listings in Texas is related to a 0.05 percent decrease in quarterly 
hotel revenues. The impacts range across the industry, with lower-end hotels and hotels not 
serving business travellers being most prone to competition. Observing the patterns of 
substitution, the authors suggest that Airbnb accommodation serves as a feasible, but imperfect, 
substitute for traditional hotel stays. As the impacts are unevenly distributed across the industry, 
stays in short-term apartments and home rentals are most likely to displace stays in lower-end 
hotels not catering to business travellers.  
For the market to be efficient, accommodation services and other sharing systems rely on 
reciprocity between members (Lauterbach et al., 2009). If all users receive access, but not 
enough users are able or willing to give access to their goods and spaces, the systems could 
support far fewer transactions. Bearing this in mind, Lauterbach et al. (2009) study the 
frequency of direct reciprocity between travellers and hosts on the accommodation platform 
Couchsurfing. Their analysis reveals that 12 to 18 percent of the reported stays were directly 
reciprocated, demonstrating that meaningful relationships are created through sharing. In order 
to encourage reciprocity, sharing platforms like Couchsurfing provide reputation and rating 
systems where users may comment on other users’ behaviour. As users know that their 
behaviour today influences the likelihood of future transactions, they are likely to behave well 
in order to protect their reputation (Botsman & Rogers, 2011).  
In an ongoing study, Fremstad (2014) assesses the economic benefits of decentralised sharing, 
measured as the gap between the rental/asset price ratio of rental companies and the ratio 
consumers are willing to pay to borrow an asset of the same value. Using data from 
NeighborGoods, a platform for lending and borrowing goods among friends and neighbours, 
the author finds that the current value of peer-to-peer sharing is at least $179 a year for 30 
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percent of Americans and at least $774 a year for eight percent of Americans. Potential gains 
may be left unexploited, as people tend to forget checking the sharing networks’ inventory when 
they need something, suggesting low awareness of online sharing systems. Respondents further 
thought there were too few users in their area. This is in line with the findings of Botsman and 
Rogers (2011), suggesting that building a critical mass is a prerequisite for peer-to-peer sharing.  
However, if online platforms facilitate a higher degree of acceptancy towards decentralised 
sharing, Fremstad (2014) suggests that the average household would gain at least one thousand 
dollars a year from sharing. The author uses the current expenditures on shareable goods as an 
upper bound for the potential value of sharing, but ignores the social costs and benefits of 
sharing, making the estimate imperfect. 
In order to address this gap, we include the social costs and benefits in the utility achieved from 
sharing in the following theoretical analysis. As argued in prior work (Zervas et al., 2014), 
studies on social welfare are demanded to fully understand the benefits of the sharing economy. 
Our work contributes to this by describing consumer preferences in the sharing economy, 
modelling consumers’ choice of providing and receiving access to spare resources.  
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4. Model of consumer behaviour 
Based on the theoretical insight of Benkler (2004) and Müller (2014), we develop a model to 
explain consumer behaviour in the context of peer-to-peer sharing. The model considers sharing 
practices among loosely connected individuals, and seeks to explain sharing of private 
economic goods, initially owned by individuals for their own use. Considering private goods, 
consumption is rivalry - sharing an asset with one individual may prevent simultaneous 
consumption by other individuals.  
To simplify the theoretical analysis, we apply the model to the market for ridesharing, where 
owners with empty seats are connected with passengers looking for a ride, through some form 
of sharing platform. Associated with car owners permitting other passengers to ride along in 
the same car to the same destination, this type of sharing is different from carsharing, in which 
a fleet of cars, owned by a community or a company, is made available to consumers through 
short-term rental. In the latter case, the consumer has the entire car at her disposal and may ride 
alone from A to B.  
Addressing the gap between supply and demand for mobility, ridesharing provides a context to 
study behaviour in the sharing economy. Consistent with the theoretical model of Benkler 
(2004), a car is only likely to be shared on a partial exclusion basis. Through online sharing 
systems, car owners may offer a ride to other passengers, suggesting sharing based on both 
market and social selection. Correspondingly, consumers who need to travel but do not have a 
car can find a trusted driver. These options, to give or get a ride, describe the meaning of sharing 
in the ridesharing context, and define the frames of consumer behaviour in the sharing economy. 
Through online sharing systems, consumers who did not own a car initially may now improve 
their mobility without needing to purchase a vehicle. Consistent with empirical research 
(Cervero et al., 2007; Martin et al., 2010), consumers who used to own a car might trade their 
cars in for a ridesharing membership, suggesting a decrease in demand for privately owned 
vehicles. In accordance with Benkler (2004), the more efficient the sharing market, the less 
incentive there will be for the marginal consumer to purchase a new vehicle, because she will 
be able to obtain functionality from sharing. For others, the opportunity to share may be the 
deciding factor for buying a car, indicating that the opportunity to share affects both the 
purchase and usage decision.  
 
        21 
Enabling generalised reciprocity, online sharing systems allow users to either provide or obtain 
access to a car. Accordingly, individual A may offer a ride to individual B, but B does not need 
to reciprocate directly by offering a ride to A. If owning a car, individual B may give rides to 
other members of the sharing system or choose not to share her car with others. Otherwise, B 
may decide only to ride with others or not to ride at all. Thus, given the nature of ridesharing 
systems, the following four consumer segments1 can be identified: 
1. Consumers who own a car but do not share the ride with others (𝑂 ∧ 𝑆̅) 
2. Consumers who own a car and share the ride with others (𝑂 ∧ 𝑆) 
3. Consumers who do not own a car, but ride with others (?̅? ∧ 𝑆) 
4. Consumers who neither own nor share a car (?̅? ∧ 𝑆̅) 
To structure the decision making process, we consider a two-stage model. In the first stage, the 
consumer decides whether to purchase a car or not.  Given that a car is purchased, the consumer 
act as a supplier in the second stage, facing the decision of riding alone or offering a ride to 
others. If not purchasing a car, the consumer has the option to ride with others or choose other 
modes of transport. For simplicity, we assume that the competing mode of transport is public 
transport. Depending on the decisions made by the individual, there are four outcomes, 
corresponding to the strategies of the four consumer segments. The set of outcomes are jointly 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive, meaning that only one of the alternatives can be chosen.  
Modelling a sequential decision problem, optimal consumer choice is determined by backwards 
induction. Consistent with rational utility models, we assume that the consumer will choose the 
strategy yielding the highest net utility. Consumer decisions and the corresponding segments 
are described graphically in Figure 4.1.  
 
 
                                                             
1 The consumer segmentation is an extended version of Ghose et al.’s (2006) market segmentation for selling 
used books in the secondary market, referred to in Müller (2014). 
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Figure 4.1. Decision tree and corresponding segments in the market for ridesharing 
 
Assuming that the number of trips (𝑥) is the same regardless of the mode of transport, we 
consider a single trip from A to B and evaluate the benefits and costs of each option. The utility 
per trip is monetarily measurable and depends upon the individual valuation of owning and/or 
sharing a car.  
Let 𝜃 be the consumer’s valuation of owning a car. A consumer with a higher 𝜃 attaches a 
higher monetary utility to the ownership of a car than one with a lower 𝜃. Further, let 𝛾 denote 
the utility achieved from ridesharing, either as owner or as passenger. Consistent with Benkler 
(2004), the benefits from sharing may be instrumental, such as being able to use carsharing 
lanes, and non-instrumental, like having company and protecting the environment. For 
simplicity, we assume that a consumer who neither owns nor shares achieves the utility 𝛿 from 
using public transport.  
Competing decisions in the market for ridesharing entail different costs per trip. Let 𝑝𝑂 denote 
the price of owning a car, mirroring the operational costs per trip including fuel costs, 
maintenance costs and insurance. Further, let 𝑝𝑆 be the price of sharing a given trip, reflecting 
a part of the price of owning. Here, the passenger’s cost is the owner’s revenue. Assuming that 
the price of sharing is used to discharge the owner’s operational costs rather than to generate 
profit, 𝑝𝑆 < 𝑝𝑂. In addition to the direct expenditure, transaction costs 𝑝𝑇𝑂 and 𝑝𝑇𝑆 arise, for 
the owner and passenger respectively, as they need to search for a trustworthy travelling 
companion and physically arrange the sharing. Finally, 𝑝𝐵 denotes the price of public transport.  
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4.1 The supply of shareable goods 
We begin by modelling the upper terminal node of the tree, corresponding to the decision of 
riding alone or offering a ride to others. Considering a single trip in a car going from A to B, 
we draw on the theoretical model of Benkler (2004) to explain the supply side of the sharing 
economy. For a consumer who owns a car and rides alone (O ∧ S̅), the net utility per trip is 
given by the difference between the utility of ownership and the price of owning. 
 𝑈𝑂∧𝑆̅ = 𝜃 − 𝑝𝑂 (4.1) 
Once a consumer decides to ride alone, idle capacity is created in the form of four empty seats. 
Duly, as noted by Benkler (2004), the owner has the opportunity to benefit if she can earn any 
positive utility from increasing the utilisation rate through sharing. This is so whether the 
opportunity cost takes the form of revenue generated by sharing, social and psychological gains 
or environmental benefits. To account for this fact, it is assumed that the car owner achieves 
the added utility 𝛾 and the revenue 𝑝𝑆 from sharing her car. Thus, for a consumer who owns a 
car and shares the ride (O ∧ S), the net utility per trip is given by the sum of the utility of 
ownership, the utility of sharing, the price of owning, the revenue generated from sharing the 
trip and the transaction cost. 
 𝑈𝑂∧𝑆 = 𝜃 + 𝛾 − 𝑝𝑂 + 𝑝𝑆 − 𝑝𝑇𝑂  (4.2) 
An evaluation of the competing approaches of usage requires a comparison of the net utility 
achieved from the two alternatives. For given prices, the consumer will be indifferent between 
riding alone and sharing the ride when the two choices provide equal utility. That is, when 
 𝑈𝑂∧𝑆̅ = 𝑈𝑂∧𝑆  
Substituting equations (4.1) and (4.2) into the expression above gives 
 𝜃 − 𝑝𝑂 = 𝜃 + 𝛾 − 𝑝𝑂 + 𝑝𝑆 − 𝑝𝑇𝑂  
Rearranging the equation, we obtain an expression for the indifferent consumer’s valuation of 
offering a ride, ?̅?  
 ?̅?  = 𝑝𝑇𝑂 − 𝑝𝑆 (4.3) 
Note from equation (4.3) that the cost of owning is eliminated, as it is incurred regardless of 
whether the ride is shared with others or not. Thus, consistent with prior literature, an owner 
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will choose to share her ride with others if the benefit of sharing is greater than the cost. Put 
differently, if 
 𝛾 > 𝑝𝑇𝑂 − 𝑝𝑆  
From the expression above, we note that the decision to offer a ride is dependent on the owner’s 
transaction cost and revenue associated with sharing.  
4.2 The demand of shareable goods 
Turning to the lower terminal node of the tree, we consider the demand side of the sharing 
economy, in which the consumer decides to either ride with others or use public transport to get 
from A to B. For a consumer who does not own a car, but get access to one through ridesharing 
(O̅ ∧ S), the net utility is given by the difference between the utility achieved from sharing, the 
price of sharing and the transaction cost. 
 𝑈?̅?∧𝑆 = 𝛾 − 𝑝𝑆 − 𝑝𝑇𝑆 (4.4) 
Similarly, for a consumer who neither owns nor shares a car (O̅ ∧ S̅), the net utility is given by 
the difference between the utility and cost of public transport. 
 𝑈?̅?∧𝑆̅ = 𝛿 − 𝑝𝐵 (4.5) 
For given prices, the consumer will be indifferent between getting a ride and using public 
transport when the two options provide equal utility. That is, when 
 𝑈?̅?∧𝑆 = 𝑈?̅?∧𝑆̅  
Inserting the utility expressions from (4.4) and (4.5) into the expression above gives 
 𝛾 − 𝑝𝑆 − 𝑝𝑇𝑆 = 𝛿 − 𝑝𝐵  
At this point, the net utility achieved from public transport defines the minimum net utility that 
must be achieved in order to be willing to rideshare. Rearranging the equation, we obtain an 
expression for the indifferent consumer’s valuation of getting a ride, ?̅?  
 ?̅? = (𝑝𝑆 + 𝑝𝑇𝑆) + (𝛿 − 𝑝𝐵) (4.6) 
As we consider the demand for ridesharing, this expression for ?̅? is substantially different from 
equation (4.3) where the price of sharing signifies the owner’s revenue. Accordingly, a 
consumer will choose to ride with others if 
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 𝛾 > (𝑝𝑆 + 𝑝𝑇𝑆) + (𝛿 − 𝑝𝐵)  
That is, when the utility generated from ridesharing exceeds the total cost of getting a ride and 
the net utility obtained from using public transport. The net utility of using public transport 
represents the opportunity cost of getting a ride, arising as the consumer loses the potential 
gains from public transport when choosing to ride with others. Although social and 
environmental motivations may trigger both options, ridesharing is likely to be a faster, more 
flexible and efficient way of travelling than public transport. In most cases, ridesharing also 
emerges as a more economical alternative than public transit, indicating that (𝑝𝑆 + 𝑝𝑇𝑆) < 𝑝𝐵. 
Although we mainly study consumers where this condition holds, it is important to note that 
the total cost of sharing may exceed the cost of public transit in other cases, as, for instance, 
consumers live in remote areas or face a weak supply of rides.  
4.3 The purchase decision 
Conditioned on the decisions being made in the terminal nodes, we work backward to predict 
behaviour at the initial node, corresponding to the decision to purchase or not to purchase a car. 
Consistent with prior literature (Lamberton & Rose, 2012), the purchase decision is depending 
on the perceived utility, and thus the perceived degree of substitutability between ridesharing 
and ownership. We use the contingent solutions from the terminal nodes to determine the 
optimal course of action available at this point.  
Supposing the consumer places a high value on ridesharing, (𝛾 > ?̅?), we determine the optimal 
initial decision by comparing the decisions to offer and get a ride. Conditioned on these 
decisions being made, the consumer will be indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing 
a car when the two options provide equal utility. For given prices, that is when 
 𝑈𝑂∧𝑆 = 𝑈?̅?∧𝑆  
Inserting (4.2) and (4.4) into the equation above, we get 
 𝜃 + 𝛾 − 𝑝𝑂 + 𝑝𝑆 − 𝑝𝑇𝑂 = 𝛾 − 𝑝𝑆 − 𝑝𝑇𝑆  
Rewriting the equation, we obtain an expression for the indifferent consumer’s valuation of 
owning a car, ?̅?  
 ?̅?  = 𝑝𝑂 − 2𝑝𝑆 + 𝑝𝑇𝑂 − 𝑝𝑇𝑆 (4.7) 
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Consequently, a consumer will choose to purchase a car when 
 𝜃 > 𝑝𝑂 − 2𝑝𝑆 + 𝑝𝑇𝑂 − 𝑝𝑇𝑆  
From the equation above, we note that the decision to purchase a car is dependent on the price 
of owning, the price of sharing and the transaction costs of the owner and passenger. Thus, in 
order for car purchase to be the optimal decision, the utility derived from ownership must be 
greater than the cost of ownership incurred after the cost contribution has been accounted for, 
and the owner’s transaction cost subtracted by the passenger’s transaction cost. Both the 
passenger’s direct expenditure (𝑝𝑆) and transaction cost are subtracted in the equation, as they 
are not incurred when purchasing a car.  
The comparison of the lower-valuation segments (𝛾 < ?̅?)  is handled analogously. Now we 
assume that the optimal decisions in the upper and lower terminal node are respectively to ride 
alone and use public transport. When prices are fixed, the consumer will be indifferent between 
purchasing and not purchasing a car when these decisions generate equal utility. Namely, when 
 𝑈𝑂∧𝑆̅ = 𝑈?̅?∧𝑆̅  
Inserting the utility functions (4.1) and (4.5) into the expression above, we obtain 
 𝜃 − 𝑝𝑂 = 𝛿 − 𝑝𝐵  
Again, the indifferent consumer’s valuation of owning a car, ?̅?, follows by rearrangement: 
 ?̅? = 𝑝𝑂 + 𝛿 − 𝑝𝐵 (4.8) 
At this point, car purchase will be the optimal decision as long as  
 𝜃 > 𝑝𝑂 + 𝛿 − 𝑝𝐵  
Because the optimal decision at the first stage is contingent on the decisions being made in the 
second stage, this expression for ?̅? is substantially different from the one in (4.7). Since the 
decision in question is conditioned on the decisions not to share, neither own nor others car, the 
utility and cost of sharing a ride are left out of the equation. Now, a consumer will choose to 
purchase a car if the utility obtained from ownership exceeds the cost of ownership and the net 
utility of using public transport. The net utility of using public transport represents the 
opportunity cost of purchasing a car.  
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5. Sensitivity analysis 
With an established theoretical foundation for determining the sequence of optimal decisions, 
we can evaluate the sensitivity of consumer behaviour to a change in parameter values. By 
studying how the segmentation of consumers is affected by a change in costs, the model may 
be used to predict changes in demand for ownership and ridesharing. Recall from chapter 4 that 
the net utility derived from the strategies of the four consumer segments is dependent on the 
individual utility achieved from owning and sharing a car, and the various cost parameters. As 
different strategies are associated with different costs and utility, net utility will differ 
depending on the consumer’s choice of strategy. 
To simplify the analysis, we normalise the net utility achieved from public transport to zero, 
𝛿 − 𝑝𝐵 = 0. For given prices
2, the choice of strategy corresponding to the four consumer 
segments can then be expressed as a function of 𝜃 and 𝛾. This provides the basis for a two-
dimensional division of consumers, in which the indifference points ?̅? and ?̅? mark the partition 
of consumers into the four segments, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. Both partition lines are kinked, 
as there are two expressions for each indifference point, depending on which strategies that are 
being compared.  
 
Figure 5.1. Optimal decisions expressed as a function of 𝜃 and 𝛾 
                                                             
2 As a starting point, we assume that the following costs arise per trip: 𝑝𝑂 = 20, 𝑝𝑆 = 6, 𝑝𝑇𝑂= 5 and 𝑝𝑇𝑆 = 3.  
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Whereas the consumer located at the left part of ?̅? will be indifferent between riding with others 
and using public transport, the consumer located at the right part of ?̅? will be indifferent between 
sharing her car with others and riding alone. Similarly, the consumer located at the upper part 
of ?̅? will be indifferent between getting a ride and offering a ride, and the consumer located at 
the lower part of ?̅? will be indifferent between using public transport and riding alone in her 
own car. As the distribution of consumers spanned by 𝜃 and 𝛾 is exogenously given, the number 
of consumers in each segment cannot be predicted by the model.  
Calculus allows us to obtain the changes in ?̅? and ?̅? for a change in a given price, holding other 
factors fixed. The actual impact on consumer behaviour will depend on the actual distribution 
of consumers and the prices observed in the market.  
5.1 Changing the price of sharing 
We begin by testing how a change in the price of sharing will influence consumer allocation. 
From the expressions for ?̅? (4.7) and ?̅?, (4.3) and (4.6), we note that the price of sharing affects 
both the initial purchase decision and the subsequent choices. Considering first the decision to 
purchase or not to purchase a car for a consumer who shares, the corresponding change in ?̅? 
with respect to the price of sharing is given by 
 𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑝𝑆
= −2 (5.1) 
Holding other prices fixed, a decrease in the price of sharing is associated with an increase in 
?̅?, indicating that the indifference point shifts to the right. When the price of sharing declines, 
ridesharing emerges as a more attractive alternative from a passenger’s point of view, and the 
consumer must therefore attach a higher utility to ownership to be willing to purchase a car. As 
revenue decreases for owners offering a ride to others, more consumers will choose not to 
purchase a car, and ride with others instead. Separately, this leads to an increase in the segment 
of consumers who do not own a car but ride with others, represented by the movement in the 
upper part of the vertical dividing line in Figure 5.2.  
Assessing the subsequent choice of usage for those who decide to purchase a car, we use 
equation (4.3) to derive the partial derivative of ?̅? with respect to the price of sharing: 
 𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑝𝑆
= −1 (5.2) 
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The derivative tells us that a decrease in the price of sharing is associated with an increase in ?̅?, 
indicating that the point of indifference between riding alone and sharing the ride shifts 
upwards. Since the financial benefits of sharing has been reduced, consumers must attach a 
higher utility to sharing to be willing to share the ride with others. The isolated effect is an 
increase in the segment of car owners who ride alone, illustrated by the movement in the right 
part of the horizontal dividing line in Figure 5.2.  
Examining the subsequent choice for consumers who decide not to purchase a car, we derive 
the change in ?̅? with respect to the price of sharing from equation (4.6):  
 𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑝𝑆
= 1 (5.3) 
As the derivative is positive, a decrease in the price of sharing will cause the point of 
indifference between getting a ride and using public transport to shift downwards. When the 
price of sharing drops, getting a ride appears relatively cheaper compared to using public 
transport. Consequently, more consumers will choose to ride with others, translating into a drop 
in the left part of the horizontal dividing line in Figure 5.2. 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Effect of a decrease in the price of sharing 
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Marked by the dotted lines, the movement in the two dividing lines illustrates the net effect on 
consumer allocation caused by the lower price of sharing. As |
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑝𝑆
| > |
𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑝𝑆
|, the shift in ?̅? will 
be larger than the shifts in ?̅?. From Figure 5.2 we observe that more consumers will choose not 
to purchase a car and ride with others (?̅? ∧ 𝑆) when the price of sharing declines. This 
substitution effect, in which ownership is replaced with access, is observed both in the market 
for carsharing (Cervero et al., 2007; Martin et al., 2010) and within travel accommodation 
(Zervas et al., 2014). Because sharing a car is now cheaper, consumers also enjoy an increase 
in purchase power, known as the income effect.  
As getting a ride appears relatively cheaper than using public transport, the segment of 
consumers who neither own nor share a car (?̅? ∧ 𝑆̅) is likely to experience a decline. As shown 
in Figure 5.2, fewer consumers will choose the strategy of purchasing and sharing a car (𝑂 ∧ 𝑆), 
as revenue declines for this consumer segment. While car owners placing a lower value on 
ownership will be embedded in the segment of consumers who ride with others, car owners 
placing a lower value on sharing will choose to ride alone, implying an increase in the 
segment 𝑂 ∧ 𝑆̅.  
It is interesting to view the results in light of empirical findings. Although the majority of 
ridesharing schemes are not associated with owners making profit, but rather subsidising the 
owner’s operational costs, there are circumstances where the car is shared without generating 
any revenue, such as sharing with friends and family. Additionally, ridesharing platforms give 
owners the opportunity to offer free rides. Transferring this to our model, setting 𝑝𝑆 equal to 
zero would suggest a decline in the segment of car owners offering a lift to others. However, 
while the economic returns are eliminated in this case, Benkler (2004) argues that the social 
rewards may be larger as we are likely to prefer acquaintances to strangers when deciding whom 
to share a ride with. As this type of sharing is ubiquitous, it may indicate that motives for social 
sharing go beyond financial gains. 
In addition to the direct expenditure, the cost of sharing a ride may comprise a membership or 
usage fee. For instance, the ridesharing platform GoMore charges a service fee that amounts to 
ten percent of the driver’s revenue generated through sharing (GoMore, 2015). While the 
passenger’s cost in this instance is kept constant, a usage fee directly reduces the owner’s 
revenue (𝑝𝑆), suggesting a decline in the number of owners who share their ride. 
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In accordance with empirical research (Fremstad, 2014; Ruud & Ellis, 2008), regulatory 
obstacles and social barriers inhibit consumers to choose access over ownership. In line with 
our results, supportive policies and regulations are thus proposed to reduce the price of sharing, 
promoting ridesharing as an equitable alternative to owning a car. When parking is scarce, 
ridesharing emerges as a relatively more attractive option to car ownership (Ruud & Ellis, 
2008). Accordingly, several carsharing operators provide free membership for individuals or 
cooperatives offering their private parking space to carsharing (Hertz BilPool, 2015). In our 
model, membership subsidies would lower the passenger’s cost of sharing, suggesting that more 
consumers will choose to ride with others. Reduced costs of membership has also enabled low-
income households to join carsharing (Transportation Research Board, 2005), indicating a shift 
from consumer segment ?̅? ∧ 𝑆̅ to ?̅? ∧ 𝑆. 
5.2 Changing the price of owning 
In the same manner, we turn to the expressions for ?̅?, (4.7) and (4.8), to analyse how a change 
in the price of owning affects consumer allocation. Affecting the purchase decision for both 
consumers who share and consumers who do not share, the change in ?̅? with respect to the price 
of sharing may generically be written as 
 𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑝𝑂
= 1 (5.4) 
If the price of owning falls, we note from equation (5.4) that ?̅? will decrease. The lower price 
of owning encourages consumers who place a lower value on ownership to purchase a car, 
indicating that a lower 𝜃 is required for car purchase to be the optimal decision. As owning a 
car becomes relatively cheaper, more consumers will choose to purchase a car, shifting ?̅? to the 
left. The shift is equally large for consumers who share and consumers who do not share, 
illustrated by the movement in both the upper and lower part of the vertical dividing line in 
Figure 5.3. As illustrated in the figure, the segments of owners (𝑂 ∧ 𝑆 and 𝑂 ∧ 𝑆̅ ) will expand 
at the expense of the segments of non-owners (?̅? ∧ 𝑆 and ?̅? ∧ 𝑆)̅ when the price of owning 
declines. The distribution of consumers between the segment of car owners who share and the 
segment of car owners who do not share remains the same, as the price of owning does not 
affect the subsequent decision to share the ride with others. 
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Figure 5.3. Effect of a decrease in the price of owning 
 
On the other hand, if the price of owning rises, consumers will substitute away from ownership, 
as this option now is relatively more expensive. The result is in line with the findings of Hald 
et al. (2011) who argue that the hassle and costs of ownership are the main reasons for switching 
to a shared car. As sharing gives access to costly goods at a lower price, a price increase 
reinforces the economic motives of sharing. This prediction is corresponding with the 
arguments of Duncan (2011), who highly promotes the cost saving potential of sharing. 
Comparing the costs of owning and sharing may however be difficult, as consumers do not take 
into account operational costs that are not encountered daily, such as insurance, maintenance 
and license, when using a privately owned vehicle (Transportation Research Board, 2005). If 
this is the case, consumers may underestimate the costs of owning, suggesting that more 
consumers will choose to purchase a car.   
In line with the findings of Ruud and Ellis (2008), the Transportation Research Board (2005) 
argues that reserved parking is one of the most advantageous actions local authorities can take 
in order to build a critical mass of consumers offering rides to others. In order to promote 
ridesharing, several local governments are therefore providing and financing parking spaces for 
shared vehicles. Such an initiative translates into a decline in the price of owning for car owners 
who share their ride with others (𝑂 ∧ 𝑆), indicating that more consumers will choose this 
strategy.  
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Holding the price of owning constant for consumers who ride alone, there is also evidence that 
tax-related solutions help ridesharing get a stronghold in communities (Transportation Research 
Board, 2005). By lowering the operative costs of ownership, a tax incentive scheme will benefit 
consumers who own a car and share the ride (𝑂 ∧ 𝑆), and create an incentive to share for the 
consumer segment 𝑂 ∧ 𝑆̅. Accordingly, the City Council of Bergen recently suggested road tax 
exemptions for vehicles used for ridesharing (Bergen kommune, 2015), translating into a 
decline in 𝑝𝑂 for the consumer segment 𝑂 ∧ 𝑆 in our model. In line with the theory of Benkler 
(2004), the City Council further proposes carsharing lanes to exploit the excess capacity in 
private vehicles. Reducing the capacity for the consumer segment 𝑂 ∧ 𝑆̅, this initiative 
emphasises access to carsharing lanes as a benefit of ridesharing, making single-occupancy car 
use less attractive. 
5.3 Changing the transaction costs 
A key to understanding consumer behaviour in the sharing economy is to study how alterations 
in transaction costs affect consumers’ willingness to share. As the presence of a market for 
ridesharing enables car owners to share their empty seats, rational consumers consider this in 
their utility function in the buying process. When assessing the owner’s transaction costs, we 
therefore use equation (4.7) to derive the effect on ?̅? of a change in the transaction costs for 
consumers who share: 
 𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑝𝑇𝑂
= 1 (5.5) 
From the expression above, we note that a decrease in the owner’s transaction costs is associated 
with a decrease in ?̅?. Analogous to the analysis of 𝑝𝑂  in section 5.2, owning a car becomes more 
attractive for consumers placing a lower value on ownership when the transaction costs decline. 
As a lower 𝜃 is required for car purchase to be the optimal decision, more consumers among 
those who share will choose to purchase a car. Isolated, this effect is shown by the leftwards 
movement in the upper part of the vertical dividing line in Figure 5.4.  
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Turning to the usage decision of car owners, the corresponding change in ?̅? with respect to the 
transaction costs can be derived by differentiating equation (4.3) with respect to 𝑝𝑇𝑂: 
 𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑝𝑇𝑂
= 1 (5.6) 
The derivative tells us that a decrease in the transaction costs is associated with a decrease in ?̅?. 
With lower transaction costs, offering a ride emerges as a relatively cheaper alternative, and the 
consumer must therefore attach a lower utility to sharing to be willing to offer a ride to others.  
Consequently, more owners will choose to share the ride instead of riding alone, causing a 
downwards shift in the right part of the horizontal dividing line in Figure 5.4.  
Combining the shifts in ?̅? and ?̅?, we observe from Figure 5.4 that the total effect of a decrease 
in the owner’s transaction costs is an increase in the segment of consumers who own a car and 
share the ride with others (𝑂 ∧ 𝑆), at the expense of the other strategies.  
 
 
Figure 5.4. Effect of a decrease in the owner’s transaction cost 
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In the same vein, we can analyse the impact on consumer choice of a change in the passenger’s 
transaction costs. As this cost parameter affects the initial purchase decision for consumers who 
share, we use equation (4.7) to derive the partial derivative of ?̅? with respect to the passenger’s 
transaction costs:  
 𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑝𝑇𝑆
= −1     (5.7) 
From equation (5.7), we note that a decrease in the transaction costs leads to an increase in ?̅?. 
When transaction costs decline, ridesharing emerges as a relatively cheaper alternative from a 
passenger’s perspective, thus the utility obtained from ownership must be even higher to be 
willing to purchase a car. More consumers will thus choose not to purchase a car, shifting the 
upper part of the vertical dividing line in Figure 5.5 to the right.  
Supposing a car is not purchased, the passenger’s transaction costs affect the subsequent choice 
between getting a ride and using public transport. Using equation (4.6), we derive the change 
in ?̅? with respect to the passenger’s transaction costs: 
 𝜕?̅?
𝜕𝑝𝑇𝑆
= 1     (5.8) 
The derivative tells us that a decrease in the transaction costs is associated with a decrease in  
?̅?, indicating that the indifference point shifts downwards. With lower transaction costs, 
ridesharing appears relatively cheaper compared to using public transport. Thus, more 
consumers will substitute towards this alternative, shifting the left part of the horizontal dividing 
line downwards in Figure 5.5.  
From Figure 5.5, we observe that the net change in consumer allocation occurring as a result of 
the decrease in the passenger’s transaction costs is an increase in the segment of consumers 
who do not own a car, but ride with others (?̅? ∧ 𝑆). As this segment expands, the adjacent 
segments (𝑂 ∧ 𝑆 and ?̅? ∧ 𝑆̅) will experience a decline. The segment of car owners who ride 
alone (𝑂 ∧ 𝑆̅) remains unaffected, as the passenger’s transaction costs do not affect the usage 
decision once a car is purchased. 
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Figure 5.5. Effect of a decrease in the passenger’s transaction cost 
 
Consistent with prior literature, the drop in transaction costs may explain the observed upsurge 
of consumers involved in ridesharing, either offering or getting a ride. This is supported by 
Fremstad (2014), arguing that the rise of online sharing platforms has enabled peer-to-peer 
transactions at considerably lower cost. First, the search and information costs associated with 
locating an available seat are declining. Consumers get access to a larger selection and a greater 
variety of cars and rides than in a regular market, noted as an important feature positively 
affecting the propensity to share (Ruud & Ellis, 2008). By reducing the steps and time taken to 
place an order, and increasing the number of ways to order, sharing platforms facilitate a quick 
and easy transaction. As a passenger, you simply indicate your points and time of departure and 
arrival, and subsequently choose a driver who matches your search criteria. Similarly, drivers 
publish their pick-up and drop-off points, date and time, and can accept or decline requests from 
passengers. To facilitate sharing, the ridesharing platforms automatically suggest potential 
passengers and a reasonable price per passenger, reducing both the search and bargaining costs.  
Consistent with the findings of Lauterbach et al. (2009), visible information about users’ recent 
activity and public ratings simplifies the choice of travelling companions, lowering both the 
information and decision costs. Transparent feedback mechanisms further reduce the policing 
and enforcement costs, as dishonesty about price and condition of what is being shared will be 
publicly displayed to other members. Users are encouraged and rewarded for openness, trust 
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and reciprocity. As noted by Benkler (2004), sharing communities self-moderate, using social 
norms and ridesharing rules to regulate the transactions and punish users who do not comply 
the collaborative conduct. In addition to feedback mechanisms, ridesharing platforms enhance 
safety through verification of member identities, online payment and confidentiality in regards 
to member data (GoMore, 2015). Translating into a drop in 𝑝𝑇𝑂 and 𝑝𝑇𝑆, these features are 
likely to increase the number of consumers who rideshare, as owners and passengers 
respectively. Summing up the effect, the actual distribution between the segments ?̅? ∧ 𝑆 and 
𝑂 ∧ 𝑆 will depend on the relative change in transaction costs, as the costs are likely to drop 
simultaneously.    
5.4 Changing the utility achieved from sharing  
Although the distribution of consumers spanned by 𝜃 and 𝛾 is considered given in the model, 
it may evolve over time as preferences and attitudes toward sharing and ownership change. This 
is supported by research by Luca and Pace (2014), suggesting that the propensity to share 
increases with augmented knowledge of the system. Rochelandet and Le Guel (2005) also argue 
that the individual utility achieved from sharing increases with the number of members in a 
peer-to-peer sharing system.  
Consistent with Benkler (2004), we suggest that the propensity to share is highly dependent on 
the net utility achieved from ridesharing. In order to understand the decision to share, it is 
therefore essential to identify the various sources of utility in a ridesharing context. As 𝛾 may 
be interpreted as the social-psychological gains from sharing, an improvement in psychological 
elements such as trust, safety and reliability is likely to increase the number who rideshares in 
the long term. Recent empirical work (Botsman & Rogers, 2011; Fremstad, 2014) shows that 
online sharing platforms are contributing to this by providing feedback and rating mechanisms, 
enhancing trust between strangers.  
Likewise, more consumers may choose ridesharing as awareness about the environmental 
benefits rises. This corresponds with the findings of Hald et al. (2011), noting environmental 
concerns as an important motive for participating in carsharing. In general, the utility achieved 
from ridesharing is dependent on the degree to which a consumer perceives ridesharing as a 
substitute for ownership. This substitutability will always be a matter of degree, something that 
is likely to change over time.  
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6. Discussion and future work 
The theoretical model of consumer behaviour is developed to explain consumers’ choice of 
both providing and receiving access to shareable goods. Studying the case of ridesharing, which 
has emerged as a feasible alternative to car ownership, we identify that the possibility to share 
affects both the purchase and usage decision of cars. As consumers are affected differently by 
the introduction of peer-to-peer sharing, we differentiate between four consumer segments. 
Explaining the allocation of consumers to these segments, the model may be used to make 
predictions on how behaviour is affected by a change in the costs related to ownership and 
sharing of privately owned vehicles. In order to assess the actual distribution of consumers all 
parameters should be quantified empirically. 
The introduction of two utility parameters, 𝜃 and 𝛾, provides the basis for a two-dimensional 
division of consumers. Müller (2014), on the other hand, presents a one-dimensional analysis, 
using 𝜃 to describe the overall utility obtained by using underutilised goods and spaces. The 
analysis is done only for the consumer groups who buy and share and those who only share, 
equivalent to 𝑂 ∧ 𝑆 and ?̅? ∧ 𝑆 in our model. Ignoring the segment of consumers who buy but 
not share (𝑂 ∧ 𝑆̅) reveals a limitation in his model. Although there are economic gains from 
sharing3, some consumers prefer not to share their goods with others, thus there must be an 
added value placed on not sharing, such as increased privacy, flexibility and independence. To 
account for this, we assume that individuals riding alone obtain a lower utility from sharing a 
ride compared to consumers who share. Although Müller’s model is generalised, and thus may 
be applied to a broad range of shared goods, the model appears too abstracted from the kind of 
resource that is shared. Sharing cars, bikes or lawn mowers, mentioned as examples in his paper, 
clearly comes at a price. By disregarding both the operational cost of personal use and the 
transaction cost that arises through sharing, the net utility for consumers who buy and share 
will be overestimated.  
Because ridesharing is a recent phenomenon, precise data on the costs and value consumers 
place on the different aspects of sharing does not yet exist. Lamberton and Rose (2012) propose 
however three types of costs that are likely to have an impact on consumer choice: membership 
or access fees, technical costs and search costs. Like us, they highlight that transaction costs 
arise when both searching for and accessing goods. Their model relies on various sources of 
                                                             
3 This is supported by research conducted by Fremstad (2014) who finds that there are substantial gains from 
sharing underutilised goods, particularly private vehicles.  
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sharing utility, demonstrating that the interpretations of 𝛾 are many. Although this creates a 
more sophisticated model, many variables may complicate the interpretation. Interestingly, in 
contrast to our suggestions, they find that consumers’ propensity to share does not appear to be 
driven by environmental benefits. Examining which actual costs and sources of utility that 
determine consumer choice would therefore be an interesting path for future research.  
Similar to Benkler’s (2004) analysis, we find that declined transaction costs, both for peer 
providers and peer users, may explain the increase in the number who engages in sharing. While 
the author only analyses decisions on the supply side of the market for ridesharing, our inclusion 
of the demand side allows for a more nuanced analysis of the shift between ownership and 
access to a car, which is often observed in the sharing economy. However, our model disregards 
the broad spectre of choices on the supply side related to the inclusion and exclusion of others 
in the car. By limiting the comparison to perfect and selective exclusion, represented by the 
consumer segments 𝑂 ∧ 𝑆̅ and 𝑂 ∧ 𝑆 respectively, the model does not take into account the 
opportunity cost related to other alternatives of sharing. Still, as previously argued, perfect and 
selective exclusion seem to be the most relevant alternatives in our example. Revealing the 
essence of consumer behaviour in a ridesharing context, the model provides straightforward 
implementation and easy economical interpretations, which may be considered some of its 
strengths. The model is however applicable to other ridesharing contexts, such as nonselective 
sharing on a first come, first served basis, where drivers and passengers arrange a common 
pick-up place. Such an analysis should include a comparison of the costs of selective and non-
selective exclusion.  
6.1 Model applications 
Understanding supply and demand in the market for ridesharing is further important for public 
policy decisions. In that manner, the model may be applied to analyse the effect of price 
adjustments on the demand for cars, and consequently the negative externalities related to 
driving. Although the effects on aggregated demand cannot be predicted, an analysis of shifts 
in consumer segmentation may serve as an important input to decide how demand is affected 
by a change in the costs related to ownership and usage of a car. The analysis is transferrable 
to the purchase and use of other private goods where sharing appears as a feasible alternative 
to ownership.  
Knowledge about demand-determining variables will allow organisations and governments to 
predict the outcome of policy instruments to limit single-occupancy car use, or likewise 
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promote ridesharing. Assuming a consumer who purchases a car also uses it; congestion, carbon 
emissions and roadway noise from driving impose a social cost affecting the welfare of others. 
Because the negative externalities are not reflected in market prices, the consumer does not take 
into account the harms when deciding to use the car. Unless these costs are internalised, too 
many consumers will use the road, resulting in congestion and high levels of emissions. 
Consistent with the results of Martin et al. (2010), our model suggests that more consumers will 
choose not to purchase a car if the price of owning increases. Accordingly, remedies pointed 
directly towards the operational costs of owning, such as congestion pricing and gas tax, may 
reduce the total volume of privately owned vehicles on the road. It is however important to note 
that we only consider the variation in consumer allocation brought about by the change in one 
cost parameter at the time. Normally, an increase in the price of owning will lead to an increase 
in the price of sharing, as the latter is considered a contribution towards the owner’s cost of the 
trip. To analyse the effect on behaviour when both prices change simultaneously, the derivative 
of ?̅? with respect to 𝑝𝑂 and 𝑝𝑆 must be calculated.  
However, not purchasing a vehicle does not require a switch to ridesharing. If repairing an old 
car or buying a used one prove less costly than the adoption of ridesharing, a rational consumer 
would prefer not to rideshare. This is supported by research conducted by Duncan (2011), who 
finds that the cost-saving potential of carsharing declines if a household is considering buying 
a used car. Allowing for these alternatives requires a considerable extension of the model, 
including a quantification of all externalities related to driving. Only when the market prices 
reflect the marginal externalities imposed per trip, is the inefficiency eliminated and the 
consumer facing the actual social cost in the purchase decision.  
More broadly, the model is applicable to sharing of idle resources beyond vehicles, such as 
vacation homes, commercial spaces, tools, bikes and even pets. First, a consumer weighing the 
option between purchasing and accessing any kind of goods must go through a decision pattern 
as described in chapter 4. Each decision can be regarded as a cost-benefit analysis that compares 
the cost and utility of the available options. Whereas the prices of owning and sharing may be 
generalised, the interpretation of 𝛾 is highly context specific, as the sources of utility are likely 
to vary depending on the asset being shared. While a power drill, for instance, is likely to be 
shared out of practical reasons, a shared pet can add social and psychological value for animal 
lovers. Along with research reporting a wide range of motivations for sharing private goods 
(Benkler, 2004; Fremstad, 2014), specific utility elements are also likely to affect the owner’s 
usage decision. 
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7. Conclusion 
To explain observed consumer behaviour in the sharing economy, we develop an economic 
model that describes the decisions to purchase and use shareable goods. Applying the model to 
the market for ridesharing, we first consider the consumer’s choice between purchasing and not 
purchasing a car. Assuming a car is purchased, the consumer faces the decision of whether or 
not to share the ride with others. If not purchasing a car, the consumer may ride with others or 
use public transport to get from A to B. Deriving the indifference points of these decisions, we 
establish a theoretical framework for explaining the sequence of decisions associated with the 
various consumer segments in the sharing economy.  
To increase the understanding of how the optimal decision, and thus the allocation of 
consumers, is affected by a change in the various parameters, a sensitivity analysis is performed 
for the various cost parameters. In accordance with prior literature, our model shows that lower 
transaction costs can explain the observed increase in the proportion of consumers who 
rideshare. Consistent with rational utility models, more consumers are likely to engage in 
sharing as the benefits of sharing rise.  
For given prices, the consumer will be indifferent between purchasing and not purchasing a car 
when the two choices provide equal utility. The number of consumers who purchase a car 
increases when 1) the price of sharing increases, 2) the price of owning decreases, 3) the 
owner’s transaction cost decreases and 4) the passenger’s transaction cost increases. Consistent 
with prior literature (Benkler, 2004; Fremstad, 2014), we assume that consumers will offer a 
lift in their car if the utility achieved from sharing the ride outweighs the utility achieved from 
riding alone. The number of car owners who share their ride with others increases when 1) the 
revenue generated from sharing increases, 2) the owner’s transaction cost decreases and 3) the 
passenger’s transaction cost increases. Likewise, if not purchasing a car, a consumer will be 
indifferent between riding with others and using public transport if the utility generated from 
these alternatives is the same. The number of consumers riding with others increases when 1) 
the price of sharing decreases, 2) the owner’s transaction cost increases and 3) the passenger’s 
transaction cost decreases. 
In order to fully understand consumer choice, empirical research on the various costs and 
sources of utility will be needed. As the sharing economy grows, disrupting traditional 
industries, future research should also explore adaption patterns across industries over a longer 
period. In that manner, our model may serve as a theoretical foundation for implementation in 
42 
other markets. Whereas prior literature mainly examines the financial and environmental 
impacts of peer-to-peer sharing, our model considers the impact on consumer decision-making, 
providing theoretical explanations for consumers’ choice of both providing and receiving 
access to underutilised goods. Modelling supply and demand in the sharing economy allows us 
to show the relevance of various costs and benefits in consumer choice, giving us a useful 
framework for making predictions on consumer behaviour. In that regard, our model may be 
applied to understand the choice between access and ownership in disrupted sectors.  
Predominantly affecting markets for transport and accommodation, peer-to-peer sharing is 
likely to be a substantial feature of the business landscape of tomorrow. Revealing the essence 
of consumer behaviour in the sharing economy, our results have important implications not 
only for firms’ predictions of consumer choice, but also for welfare-enhancing policies.  
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